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Abstract— Security concern for a Sensor Networks and level of 
security desired may differ according to application specific 
needs where the sensor networks are deployed. Till now, most of 
the security solutions proposed for sensor networks are layer wise 
i.e a particular solution is applicable to single layer itself. So, to 
integrate them all is a new research challenge. In this paper we 
took up the challenge and have proposed an integrated 
comprehensive security framework that will provide security 
services for all services of sensor network. We have added one 
extra component i.e. Intelligent Security Agent (ISA) to assess 
level of security and cross layer interactions. This framework has 
many components like Intrusion Detection System, Trust 
Framework, Key Management scheme and Link layer 
communication protocol. We have also tested it on three different 
application scenarios in Castalia and Omnet++ simulator. 
 
Keywords:- Security, sensor networks, key management; 
application specific security. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Wireless Sensor Networks are being employed in various 
real time fields like Military, disaster management, Industry, 
Environmental Monitoring and Agriculture Farming etc. Due 
to diversity of so many real time scenarios, security for WSNs 
becomes a complex issue. For each implementation, there are 
different type of attacks possible and demands a different 
security level. Major challenge for employing an efficient 
security scheme comes from the resource constrained nature of 
WSNs like size of sensors, Memory, Processing Power, Battery 
Power etc. and easy accessibility of wireless channels by good 
citizens and attackers. 
Although research in the sensor network security area is 
progressing at tremendous pace [15]; still there is lack of an 
integrated comprehensive framework which can provide 
security services to each layer and services of sensor networks. 
Current research in this area majorly focuses on providing 
layered solutions, which can provide security service for one 
layer only. Also some solutions address particular kind of 
attacks only.  
In a diverse application field of sensor networks, specifically 
application designer knows which data needs to be secured 
with which kind of security service [12].We can take example 
of two popular WSN applications like Agriculture Farming and 
Military Surveillance system whereas in case of agriculture 
farming only data integration (HASH functions) check can do, 
but military surveillance needs security services like 
encryption, authentication and strong resilience to node 
compromise attacks. By all means, a security setup for an 
application must always be subject to a thorough security 
evaluation in order to justify its security promises and to foster 
the application developer's awareness regarding which aspects 
are secure and which are at risk, thus avoiding a false sense of 
security. For a reasonable security evaluation, we have added 
another logical component in sensor node structure namely ISA 
(Intelligent Security Agent) which will asses security level 
needs of a particular sensor network deployment. 
In this paper, section 2 describes current approaches in 
security of sensor networks and their limitations, section 3 
formulates the security framework problem and its design 
goals, section 4 introduces all the component of framework and 
section 5 describes the simulation results and analysis of ISA. 
Finally section 6 concludes with future work.  
II. RELATED WORKS  
Extensive research is being carried out to address security 
issues in sensor networks like link layer communication 
protocol, Intrusion Detection Scheme, Secure Routing protocol, 
Trust Models, freshness transmission, key management 
schemes etc.  In this section a brief overview of the security 
solutions available in the literature are summarized. One 
common approach to create secure platforms in WSN is by 
providing link layer cryptographic primitives or libraries. 
TinySec [17], Secure Sense, and MiniSec[16] are examples of 
this approach. Although MiniSec provides energy efficient 
security compared to other link layer solutions the main 
drawback of MiniSec is in terms of providing same security 
level to each application scenarios, thus lacking adaptive 
security or scenario specific security. A very good technique 
for low overhead freshness transmission using bloom filter and 
last bit optimization is given in MiniSec. 
TinySec and Secure Sense assume to have a global common 
secret key among the nodes which is assigned before the 
deployment of the network and is used to provide security 
services such as encryption and authentication in link layer. 
The main drawback with this approach is that it is not resistant 
against node capture attacks in which an adversary can pollute 
an entire sensor network by compromising only one single 
node. In SenSec, there are three types of keys: Global Key, 
Cluster Key and Sensor key. The global key is generated by the 
base station, pre-deployed on each sensor node and shared by 
all nodes. This key is used to broadcast messages in the 
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network. However, this protocol again falls prey to node 
capture attacks in which dedicated attackers can find this global 
key and broadcast commands or data to the network. The 
provision of maximum level of security for all types of 
communication in each sensor node, as the one which appears 
in TinySec and MiniSec, is not suitable for use as in a general 
security platform for WSN since it can lead to unnecessary 
waste of system resources and noticeably reduces the network 
lifetime. Although there has been an attempt made in Secure 
Sense to address this issue; its solution cannot be well 
integrated with higher level services appropriately. In other 
solutions, like secure information routing protocols such as 
SPINS [19] and LEAP [25] or security-aware middleware 
services such as secure localization or secure time 
synchronization [8] cryptographic key management plays an 
important role. Generally there are three major approaches for 
key management in WSN namely: Deterministic pre 
assignment, Random pre-distribution and Deterministic post-
deployment derivation.  
Examples of the first approach are SPINS [19] and LEAP in 
which unique symmetric keys shared by the nodes with the 
base station are assigned before the network is deployed. Using 
this approach, cryptographically strong keys can be generated; 
however, this involves a significant pre-deployment overhead 
and is not scalable. 
Random-key distribution schemes like those in, PIKE [20] 
refer to probabilistically establishing pair wise keys between 
neighboring nodes in the network. However in this approach, a 
node has to store large number of keys. Bhaskaran Raman et al 
[26] pointed out that WSN protocols are very deeply dependent 
on Application scenarios, but most of protocols does not cite or 
use any specific application in its design. So current security 
schemes also lacks in providing security to specific scenarios 
while assessing their security needs. There are some approaches 
which addresses only routing problem like secure spin, secure 
sensor network routing and some other geographic techniques. 
Tae Kyung Kim et. al [27] gives a simple trust model using 
fuzzy logic that can effectively address the secure routing 
problem. It calculates the evaluation value for each path and 
ensures that packet is always forwarded to a high evaluation 
value path. A scheme for preventing compromised node to 
become cluster head is proposed by Garth et.al, which is based 
on trust factor. Some initiatives to provide security framework, 
which integrates two or more security schemes like secure 
cluster formation [23], key management [18] and secure 
routing [22], also combines link layer secure communication 
protocol with key distribution scheme. Security platform 
proposed in [22] provides defense against node compromised 
attacks, but does not give any mechanism to isolate them. It 
supports holistic security approach to provide security to 
WSNs. But major disadvantage of holistic security approach is 
that it tries to implement security layer wise which results in 
redundant security.  
An example to fully understand the concept of redundant 
security is to consider a black hole attack. The security 
mechanisms provided in this case is both in network as well as 
link layer. Without a systematic view such approaches would 
provide redundant security thus wasting resources and 
unintentionally launch a SSDoS (Security Service DoS) attack. 
Also when data is processed layer by layer, there can be 
different security provisions layer wise, thus providing 
redundant security. Although much progress has been made for 
the past few years, the field remains fragmented, with 
contributions dispersed over seemingly disjoint yet actually 
connected areas,  
Currently much of work is going on providing layered 
security for such as the Holistic Security Approach [2]. A 
holistic approach aims at improving performance, security, 
longevity with respect to changing environmental condition 
with some basic principles. For example in a given network 
security is to be ensured for all the layers of the protocol stack 
as shown in fig1 and also the cost of security should not be 
more than assessed security risks. But major disadvantage with 
holistic security is that it is layered and tries to implement 
security mechanisms for each layer, which results in wastage of 
power, memory, processing power and introduce message 
delay.  
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
Generally a security platform that copes with constrained 
resources of nodes while being flexible and lightweight eases 
the application development process and contributes to 
widespread deployment of sensor networks. In order to provide 
such a platform we have made a few reasonable assumptions. 
We also suppose that the base station is safe and adversaries 
cannot compromise it. Our approach does not place any trust 
assumption on the communication apart from the obvious fact 
that there is a nonzero probability of delivering messages to 
related destinations. We introduce the following design goals 
for a practical security framework in sensor networks. 
Robust, Simple and flexible Designs: - Security design 
should build trustworthy system out of untrustworthy 
components and should have ability to detect and function 
when need arises. Design should have minimum software bugs. 
Security framework should also work if we add new nodes in 
the network thus providing scalability.  
Component Based Security:-Some kind of security measures 
must be provided to all the components of a system as well as 
to network .We should concentrate on securing the whole 
chain.  
Adaptive Security:-WSNs are having numerous combination 
of sensing, communication and computing technologies and 
sensors are deployed from very sparse to dense. So depending 
on traffic characteristics and environment they have to adapt 
themselves. For ex.:- In a good environment where probability 
of security attacks is low, we should use low level of security. 
In other words, we can say that sensor node should adapt them 
according to outside environment. However we further 
categorize the notion of adaptive security into following terms. 
a) Application based:- As already described in previous section 
that each application requires different level of security like 
Military Surveillance, Habitat Monitoring etc. 
b) Data Based:- Level of security also depends on the type of 
data like there should be different level of encryption for 
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routing, sensed data, control packet data and encryption key 
information. 
c) QoS with Security: - One important question is how to trade 
off between QoS parameters while providing security. 
Unfortunately, existing security designs can address only a 
small, fixed threshold number of compromised nodes; the 
security protection completely breaks down when the threshold 
is exceeded.      
d) Realistic Design:- Current Security design lacks this design 
requirement because they have an explicit threat model in 
mind. We have to do real trace analysis for all kind of practical 
attacks possible for a particular real time scenario. 
IV. SOLUTION MODEL 
We have already seen the flaws that can be occurred in 
implementing layered security approach. So in this paper we 
would rather concentrate on cross layer security framework. In 
some of the recent works, there are cross layer implementation 
for power management schemes, path redundancy based 
security [21], Energy equivalence routing and various key 
management schemes. In support of cross layer security 
approach let us concentrate on the following points [3]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Node structure with ISA incorporated 
1.  If we want that routing should be energy efficient then 
we have to take care of routing in network layer, minimization 
of the number of control packets and  retransmission in link 
layer and putting energy transceivers On/Off in physical layer. 
2. Key management schemes make sure that all the 
communicating nodes possess required keys for encrypted 
communication. At the same time to make sure that packet 
reaches destination, a secure link with multi path routing is 
required 
There are various other reasons for adopting cross layer 
security approach and to name some we’ve heterogeneous 
requirements and services of applications domain, cross layer 
intrusion detection, detection of selfish nodes and non 
redundant security. However, Cross layer security introduces a 
significant overhead in maintaining interfaces between various 
protocol layers for exchanging parameters. However this 
overhead will be much lesser in comparison with strict layered 
architectures. To further reduce the overhead created by cross 
layered architectures, we’ve introduced ISA (Intelligent 
Security Agent) to follow the recommendations given in 
Section 3 and 4 and to provide energy efficient and non 
redundant security operation while keeping protocol layer 
abstraction intact. ISA will be used as a separate component in 
node architecture (See fig 1), which can exchange parameters 
with all protocol layers like a Resource Manager.   
We know that in a component based security framework, 
security is to be ensured for all the components and services in 
a system. So we will also address the following requirements of 
WSN Security. 
• Robust Trust Framework using Cross Layer 
Approach. 
• Trust Based Group Head Election. 
• Key Management Architecture. 
• Adaptive Secure Communication Protocol. 
• Intrusion Detection System. 
In addition to the above mentioned points the following 
assumptions are made for the proposed Trust-Framework. 
• We assume TDM (Time Division Multiplexing) 
scheduling for communication within a group. In 
TDM, in a particular interval, a node will transmit 
otherwise it will listen passively in promiscuous 
mode. So a node can hear neighborhood 
transmission/reception.   
• Each node in a network is identified by a set of 
Group id (8 Bits) and Node id (8 Bits) i.e. 
{Groupid, Nodeid}.So node communication is 
limited to group only. 
• Each node has three different types of keys viz. a 
Node Based Keys which are used to listen to 
broadcast made by Group Head, Pair Wise Keys 
which are used to facilitate communication 
between pair wise nodes and Broadcast Keys 
which are the Keys used for broadcasting. 
A. Trust Framework and Group Head Election 
In our proposed security scheme a network is divided into 
various groups and each group has its group head. Normally, to 
maximize network life time, a node with highest energy is 
chosen to be group head. Because a group head has to perform 
several other operations like data aggregation etc, the rate of 
consumption of power is very high in case of group head. We 
apply rotating group head so that when a node falls short of 
energy, it will transfer its responsibility to some other node in 
the group by election or some other measures. Here the security 
concern which arises is as follows; let us take consider the 
parameter ‘available energy’ as a measure to transfer group 
head responsibility. A compromised node or an adversary node 
would always show higher amount of energy.So there is a high 
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probability to select an adversary as a group head. Most of the 
current clustering techniques assume that all the nodes are 
trustworthy in a network. Hence, we should choose a technique 
in which probability of selection of compromised nodes as 
group head is very low. In such a technique, a node will 
continuously monitor its neighbors and maintains a parameter 
table. All the parameters values are collected from cross layer 
interactions. Depending on table parameters, it will compute a 
trust level of all its neighbors. Table parameters are given as 
TABLE I.  TRUST PARAMETERS USED IN TRUST FRAMEWORK  
Sl.
No Parameters Node1 Node2 Node m 
1. Available Energy (AE)    
2. Packet Signal Strength (PSS)    
3. Control Packet Received for forward(CRF)    
4. Control Packet Received forwarded(CRAF)    
5. Routing Cost(RC)    
6. No. of Packet Collision (NPC)    
7. Data Packet Received for forward (DRF)    
8. Data Packet Received forwarded (DRAF)    
9. Packet Dropped (PD)    
10. No. of Packets Transmitted (NPT)    
11. No. of Packets Received (NPR)    
 
• CRFi - Control Packet Received for forward for a 
particular node i. where i=1, 2… m. same 
notations apply to CRAF, DRF, DRAF, NPT, and 
NPR.  
• AEi (T1) – Available Energy for a node i at a time 
T1.Same notations also apply for PSS and RC.   
Now the trust values from these parameters are calculated 
as follows:   
 A1 = (AEi (T1) - AEi (T2)) / AEi (T1)             where T1 < T2. 
A2 = (PSSi (T1) - PSSi (T2)) / PSSi (T1)          where T1 < T2. 
A3 =   CRAFi / CRFi. 
A4 = DRAFi / DRFi. 
A5 = 1 - NPCi / NPTi. 
 A6 = 1 - PDi/ NPRi. 
Here Ti, the Trust Level of Node, is calculated by the node 
which is maintaining above table.  
 Ti=w1* A1 + w2* A2 + w3*A3 + w4* A4 + w5* A5 + w6*A6. 
Here w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6 are constants, whose value is 
chosen such that Ti < 1. 
More on Trust based cluster scheme can be obtained from 
[23].For our work we considered  some extra parameters as 
well as discarded some of them while calculating trust value to 
make our scheme more generalized and robust. After 
computing trust level of each neighbor, a node will use these 
values for routing purposes also. Steps for choosing group head 
are as follows 
• Step-1: Whenever a group head finds that it is unable 
to bear the group head responsibility due to some 
reasons like low energy etc. then it will broadcast a 
message for a re-election. 
• Step-2: If a node gets election message, then it will 
find a neighbor with highest trust value and sends this 
to current group head as a vote.  
• Step-3: Now, group head will assign this 
responsibility to the node having the highest number 
of votes. For greater integrity, a vice group head can 
also be chosen but not necessarily. A vice group is 
needed because sometimes there can be failure of new 
elected group head before transferring responsibility. 
Ids of group head and vice group head will directly be 
broadcasted to all group members using a secret key. 
All communication described above must be done by 
using appropriate keys as described in the next 
section. 
B. Key Management Architecture 
The scheme proposed by Hamed et. al [14] provides a 
strong defense to node compromised attacks, while being very 
simple to implement. But the major drawback of this scheme is 
that it does not provide any mechanism for changing keys 
periodically, because it derives all the three types of keys from 
the key given before deployment. There is also no mechanism 
to isolate compromised node from a network. So we propose a 
modified key management protocol which keeps all the 
advantages provided by Hamed et. al and at the same time try 
to remove some of the drawbacks of [14]. We assume that K is 
a key that all sensor nodes initially have. At the time of initial 
deployment following algorithm is executed: 
Algorithm   Key Management (K: Master Key) 
// Master key is that a node has from deployment time. 
Begin 
A node i will broadcast its id encrypted by key K to all the 
neighbors. 
Suppose a node j is neighbor of node i, then in its response 
it will also sent its id encrypted by key K.  
Node i will compute all of its keys  
NBi= F (i  || Group Head ID || K), 
PW i,j = F (min(i,j) || max(i,j) || K), 
BCi = F (i || K).  Here || is concatenation operator. 
In the same way node j and all other neighbors will 
calculate the above three types of keys using master key K.  
Similarly all other nodes will calculate required keys, after 
which they’ll have to delete the master key to be resilient 
against node capture attacks. 
End 
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In key establishment protocol by Hemed et. al, they send 
PW i,j , BCi  encrypted using NBj. But to reduce communication 
overhead, we choose to compute them at j, because 
communication is three orders of magnitude more expensive 
than computation. Now if the same keys are to be used all the 
times in a network and a node becomes compromised, although 
the effect will be limited only to neighborhood , it can send 
group head a false information or launch a DoS (Denial of 
Service) attack to decrease the energy level of its neighbors. So 
we should isolate compromised nodes as soon as possible. To 
isolate them we propose following hierarchical Key Revocation 
Algorithm.  
At the starting of each session, Base Station will distribute a 
key to the corresponding cluster heads; Cluster head will 
generate a new key   K1= F (Group ID || Base Station Address 
|| K) and subsequently multicasts the key K1.But the key K1 
will be sent only  to  those nodes having high trust value.  So in 
the previous session, if a node becomes compromised then its 
trust value will decrease automatically and it will not get hold 
of new key.   
C. Adaptive Secure Communication Protocol 
None of the link layer security protocol proposed till now 
provides adaptive security. So we have proposed an adaptive 
security protocol, which dynamically adjusts itself to a 
particular security level depending on the network state. 
Mechanism of providing adaptive security is handled by the 
proposed component ISA (Intelligent Security Agent), which is 
used to make cross layer interactions easier.  
Packet Format 
Figure -2 Comparative Analysis of Packet Structure of Different             
Link Layer Protocols        
We have already described the limitations of current link 
layer protocols in Section 2. We will describe our protocol 
based on desired security properties that a protocol should 
possess.   
Tinysec[17] uses CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode to 
provide message authentication (CBC-MAC).It minimizes the 
cryptographic primitives, but Tinysec-AE has to perform two 
CBC mode encryption and CBC mode authentication at a 
sender side and a CBC-MAC mode authentication and CBC 
mode decryption at receiver side, which requires two 
symmetric key operations cycles to compute encryption and 
MAC. This overhead can be reduced greatly by using 
authenticated –encryption method such as OCB, CBC-X etc. 
We use OCB to generate cipher text as well as MAC in only 
one symmetric key operation (Also used in Minisec). 
In Tinysec[17] packets, Source and Destination field is of 2 
bytes, so we can say that a network can support 2^16=65536 
number of nodes. We have introduced Group field because use 
of group field is crucial for many applications in sensor 
networks and also if we use a group field of 8 bits then a 
network can support 256 different groups, and using source id 
and destination id of 8 bits, a group can support 256 different 
nodes. 
In our scheme, the number of nodes that a network can 
support is 256*256=65536 nodes, same as that of Tinysec. 
Packet overhead due to source and destination id in Tinysec is 
of 2+2=4 bytes. But in our scheme it is 3 bytes (including 
group filed).It is because a node can be distinguished by using 
{Groupid , Sourceid} or {Groupid, Destinationid}.This is 
consistent with our previous assumption that the 
communication of a node is limited to its group members only. 
Maximal payload length in Tinysec packet can be of 
29bytes.So payload length cannot be greater than 5 bits and 
MSB 3bits are unused in each data packet to be sent. We have 
utilized MSB 3bits for providing adaptive security. First 2 bits 
will be used for encryption level and the third bit will be used 
for authentication purpose. 
Now, we will discuss how the communication protocol 
mentioned above preserves the required security properties. 
TABLE 2: DIFFERENT LEVEL OF ENCRYPTION 
Bits Rep Level Operation 
00  Level -0 Simple XOR 
01 Level-1 RC5/80/4 
10 Level-2 RC5/80/8 
11 Level-3 RC5/80/12 
                     
Here RC5/80/4 represents RC5 encryption algorithm with 
key size 80 bits and encryption rounds 4. 
Data Secrecy and Authentication: - We are using RC5 as 
block cipher for encryption coupled with OCB, so that both 
encryption and authentication are achieved in only one pass, 
thus saving in processing time and energy at sensor node. 
Sensor node uses encryption to provide data secrecy, but 
sometimes there is very little difference in consecutive readings 
of a sensor node .We have used a nonce as a counter, which is 
used in encryption, thus ensuring each time different cipher text 
is generated. We have used four level of encryption to provide 
adaptive security. Level of encryption will be provided by ISA. 
Replay Protection and Freshness Check: Replay protection 
is provided by using a monotonically increasing counter value 
at both ends or using a time stamp in the message. We have 
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provided the counter value in a packet header that is used to 
defend replay attacks. A monotonically increasing counter of 
32 bits is used at the both ends. But only the last 8 bits is sent 
in the packet for saving transmission and reception energy. The 
whole operation is given as follows 
• Assume that both the receiver and sender are having the 
same counter value of 32 bits each. 
• Operation of RC5-OCB is applied using a counter value 
of 32bits and MAC is obtained. 
• While sending, full MAC (32 bits) is sent but we send 
only LSB 8 bits of counter value, thus saving transmission 
of 24 bits. 
• Receiver calculates an expected counter (Cs) number 
depending on the last connection / synchronization.  
• After receiving a packet the receiver will concatenate Cs 
(0-23) and received counter value (8bits). It will apply 
RC5-OCB operation to get MAC and cipher text and if 
the MAC is same, the packet is accepted, otherwise it will 
increment Cs and then try calculating MAC assuming 
some packet loss.  
There should be some bound over increment and check 
approach given in step5, which can be done by setting a 
threshold value that depends upon the network packet loss 
rate. Also it can be minimized by application of bloom filter 
[16] .Chin et. al [28] provides a LOFT protocol that 
recommends sending of only 3bits in packet. It will not suit for 
broadcast communication, so we have taken a counter value of 
8bits to make our scheme suitable for unicast as well as 
broadcast communication. To make this protocol more 
resilient to replay attacks, base station can broadcast the 
periodic counter value.   
V. SIMULATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
For implementation of our proposed framework, we have 
extended Castalia simulator based on Omnet++ by adding ISA 
(Intelligent Security Agent).The approach proposed in this 
paper stresses on group communication and diversity of 
application scenarios, so we have tested it on three different 
application scenarios i.e. ‘Military Surveillance System’, 
‘Habitat Monitoring’ and ‘Agricultural Farming’. These three 
different application scenarios correspond to high, medium and 
low level security respectively. Table 1 provides the different 
security requirements of these scenarios. A comparison is done 
between using fixed security level and variable security level as 
shown in figure 3-5.  
Military Surveillance System uses high security level (i.e. 
highest encryption level) most of the time, whereas in case of 
Agricultural Farming, only data authentication with low level 
of encryption is used. 
 Saving in energy is achieved by variable encryption level 
and flexibility of authentication and counter sending. ISA, 
depending on the current percept, will determine an adaptive 
reaction for level of security that would incorporate many 
policies, thus recommendations can also be given at 
deployment level itself or afterwards. Here percept information 
is collected from various layers using cross layer interactions 
and from the resource Manger. Percept Information may 
include following information 
 
Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 
Figure 5 
Figure 3, 4, 5.  Military Surveillance System (Very Low Saving), Habitat 
Monitoring (Moderate   Saving) and Agricultural Farming (High Saving). 
      Y Axis -Energy Consumed (Joule) and X-Axis – Node IDs 
 
Types of information considered for simulation are: 
available memory at that time, available energy, trust level of 
neighboring nodes, and predefined policies as well as 
recommendations. 
The final conclusion that can be drawn from the result is 
that the function of ISA is prominent in case where the level of 
security to be achieved is known in advance like in case of 
‘Military application’ the level of security is very high, thus the 
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use of ISA is immaterial in this case as there will be very low 
energy saving whereas in case of ‘Agricultural Farming’ ISA 
plays an important role thus the amount of energy saved is very 
high. In case of “Habitat Monitoring” energy saved is 
moderate. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Improved security is especially important for the success of 
the wireless sensor network (WSN), because the data collected 
are often sensitive and the network is particularly vulnerable. 
While a number of approaches have been proposed to provide 
security solutions against various threats to the WSN, most of 
which are based on the layered design. We have pointed out 
that these layered approaches are often inadequate and 
inefficient. For our work to design a security scheme, we 
Considered one extra component viz. ISA (Intelligent Security 
Agent), which will interact with all the layers just like a 
resource manager and provides us with an extensive list of 
information.  
Cross Layered approach is energy efficient and robust as 
shown by some of current research works. ISA helps in 
determining an adaptive reaction to security level. In our 
knowledge it is one of the first security frameworks that will 
provide security services to each layer and services of sensor 
networks. Through the simulation results, we have shown that 
energy efficient security could be achieved if we use variable 
security level for each application scenarios. We have 
simulated the above framework to test its feasibility, but the 
actual output will come from realistic implementation of this 
approach on sensor motes. So we are developing this 
framework using TinyOS as a security package. We have 
implemented a very raw form of ISA. Functions of intelligent 
security agent can be made more general and enhanced by 
employing efficient learning algorithm. 
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